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Abstract
In this paper we describe the Secure
Method Invocation (SMI) framework imple-
mented for Jason, our Javacard As Secure
Objects Networks platform. Jason real-
ises the secure object store paradigm, that
reconciles the card-as-storage-element and
card-as-processing-element views. In this
paradigm, smart cards are viewed as secure
containers for objects, whose methods can
be called straightforwardly and securely us-
ing SMI. Jason is currently being developed
as a middleware layer that securely intercon-
nects an arbitrary number of smart cards,
terminals and back-office systems over the
Internet.
1 Introduction
JavaCard1 [Che00] technology makes it
possible to develop software for a smart card
using a high level language: Java. This
technology is platform independent, it can
handle multiple applications (each running
securely within its own sandbox) on one
smart card, post-issuance applications can
be added to it and it is compatible with inter-
national standards like ISO7816 [ISO7816].
∗Id: javacard-smi.tex,v 1.10 2002/09/23 06:04:03
hoepman Exp
1http://java.sun.com/products/javacard
In fact, the JavaCard platform brought
high level, Object Oriented Programming
(OOP) to the smart card developer. Unfor-
tunately, the OOP paradigm is only applied
to the software within the smart card it-
self: invoking methods implemented by ob-
jects on the smart card still requires the
developer to send commands to the smart
card using Application Protocol Data Units
(APDU’s) [ISO7816], which have to be pro-
cessed and transformed into method calls
‘by hand’.
It would be much more natural to view an
object stored on a JavaCard as a remote ob-
ject, accessible through a remote method in-
vocation mechanism. In fact, if we look at
a smart card application at a higher level of
abstraction, we basically see a large collec-
tion of interconnected objects. Some of these
objects are stored in back offices, others in
terminals or PC’s and many more stored se-
curely on millions of smart cards. This net-
work is highly dynamic: smart cards are
usually oﬄine, and only connect to the net-
work when they are inserted into a terminal
(or when they connect to a terminal over a
wireless interface in the case of contactless
cards). Much more importantly, this network
needs to be highly secure. Access to certain
objects should be restricted, and the confid-
entiality and authenticity of the communic-
ation between the objects has to be guaran-
teed.
Hartel et al. [HJF95] pose that a smart
card should be seen as a processing element
rather than a storage element (as is tradi-
tionally done). In our opinion these views
are not contradictory at all, but rather sup-
plement each other nicely in the secure ob-
ject store paradigm. In this paradigm, smart
cards are viewed as secure containers for ob-
jects, whose methods can be called straight-
forwardly and securely using Secure Method
Invocation (SMI). We are currently develop-
ing the Javacards As Secure Objects Network
(Jason) platform as a middleware layer (on
these smart cards, terminals, PC’s and back
office systems) to support this paradigm. By
simplifying the communication with a smart
card, and by providing extensive support to
secure this communication, Jason aims to
greatly simplify the development of smart
card applications.
In this paper we will describe the Jason
Secure Method Invocation (SMI) scheme. In
this scheme, a Jason definition file (JDF) (re-
sembling a Java interface with some addi-
tional keywords) is used to specify the access
conditions on methods of an object. It also
specifies how the parameters of a method
call and the result should be protected when
transmitted between caller and callee. The
JDF is compiled into a stub (used by the
caller to set up a connection with the object
and to call its methods) and a skeleton (used
by the callee to accept incoming method in-
vocation requests and to handle the secur-
ity requirements). The big advantage is that
the smart card application developer only
needs to specify the security requirements,
but does not have to implement the security
protocols himself. This is done automatic-
ally, given the requirements.
The remainder of this paper is organised
as follows. We first present related research
in the next section. Then, the main require-
ments for the Jason platform are presented
in Sect. 2. The design (in terms of the applic-
ation programmers view on Jason) is given
in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses the architec-
ture and the way the Jason SMI is actually
implemented, while Sect. 5 presents a small
example of using Jason to implement a ba-
sic electronic purse. Finally, conclusions and
issues for further research appear in Sect. 6
1.1 State of the art
Itoi et al. [IFH00] add security to the Inter-
net infrastructure for smart cards developed
by Guthery et al. [Gut00, GBPR00] and Rees
et al. [RH00], adding the Simple Password
Exponential Key Exchange (SPEKE) protocol
and using the DNS as a location independent
naming scheme for the smart cards involved.
These aspects will be taken into account in
the networking and naming part of the Jason
platform.
Hagimont and Vandewalle [DH00] apply a
different approach to enforcing access con-
trol on (remote) objects. Their JCCap system
uses capabilities to specify which methods of
an object can be accessed by the owner of
that capability. Capabilities are implemen-
ted through Java interfaces, and provide a
limited view on the full interface of an as-
sociated object. This makes their system
dynamic (in the sense that capabilities can
be added and removed from the system in-
dependent of the actual implementation of
the object, and that capabilities can be del-
egated between objects. On the other hand,
they do not consider the general case of
caller and callee residing on different sys-
tems separated by a network (as well as the
terminal/card line interface). Moreover, the
very important matter of protecting the data
transfered with an actual method call is not
considered in their work.
The latest JavaCard specification (2.2) in-
cludes a lightweight version of Sun’s Remote
Method Invocation (RMI) [Sun99]. It provides
a mechanism for a client application running
on the terminal to invoke a method on a re-
mote object stored on the card just like an
invocation within the same virtual machine.
The parameters of a remote method should
be primitive (byte, boolean, short, int) or a
single-dimension array of a primitive type
(byte[], boolean[], short[], int[]). Unlike stand-
ard Java RMI, object parameters (whether re-
mote or not) are not allowed. The method
result is of primitive type, a single-dimension
array of primitive type, a remote interface ob-
ject or void. All parameters and return values
are transmitted by value, except for the re-
mote object. The remote object is transmit-
ted by reference. We have investigated sev-
eral approaches to implementing our Jason
Secure Method Invocation (SMI) system using
RMI, but none are quite satisfactory. We dis-
cuss this in Sect. 4.4.
Keht et al. [KRV00] describe the JiniCard
architecture, which allows seamless integra-
tion of smart card services in a spontaneous
network environment. The approach taken
is to keep all functionality required to inter-
act with a certain smart card remotely on the
network, and to download this functionality
into the card reader based on the ATR (An-
swer To Reset) of the particular card inser-
ted into it. They also discuss the service-as-
object metaphor, but as far as security is con-
cerned, they consider SSL sessions between
card and terminal objects over which RMI
calls are being sent. We, on the other hand,
introduce a much finer security granularity
at the method level.
There are also a number of related in-
dustry initiatives that deserve to be men-
tioned here.
The Global Platform Specification2
(formerly Visa’s Open Platform specific-
ation) is concerned with the secure and
platform independent installing and deletion
of applications on multi-application smart
cards.
The Open Card Framework3 (and the sim-
ilarly motivated PC/SC Workgroup4) aims to
allow software developers to build smart
card-aware products without having to worry
about platform, card terminal, or smart card-
specific interfaces. It supplies an API for
handling the communication between a PC
application and a smart card reader. Since
OCF is developed by the major smart card
companies, it supports all kinds of smart
cards and card readers. The application does
not even have to know which smart card
reader is being used during a communication
session with a card. OCF does not specify the
card side. The choice of a particular type of
smart card is free and may change without
changing the PC application.
2http://www.globalplatform.org
3http://www.opencard.org
4http://www.pcscworkgroup.com/
2 Platform requirements
With the Jason SMI system we want to
achieve:
• Separation of concerns: specifying se-
curity requirements (in the interface
definition of a Java applet using our
keyword approach), and their actual
implementation (provided once through
the Jason SMI system).
• Generic secured access to objects and
their methods, independent of their loc-
ation and whether they are on a compute
server or a smart card.
• Providing generic, interoperable, tools to
secure method invocations, which can
be shared among objects (decreasing the
code size) and which can be verified
once (increasing robustness and avoid-
ing repeated verification of similar per-
applet security measures).
• Decreasing the complexity of writing se-
cure (smart card) applications.
3 Design
The Jason platform implements the se-
cure object store paradigm using the follow-
ing layers.
Network layer Implements the direct con-
nection between clients, servers, ter-
minals and smart cards, using the In-
ternet Protocol. Between terminal and
smart card IP packets are transferred
as APDU’s. In particular, a smart
card (when inserted in a terminal) has
an IP address, and the terminal acts
as a gateway relaying all incoming IP
packets to the appropriate smart card
(it may contain more than one smart
card) [GBPR00].
remote method invocation layer Serialises
method parameters into bytestreams
and vice versa, and executes the call on
the remote method
secure method invocation layer Provides
access control and data confidentiality
and authenticity.
In this paper we will focus on the design of
the secure method invocation layer, and de-
scribe it as seen from the application pro-
grammer’s point of view. We will discuss the
close interdependencies with the RMI layer.
The SMI layer only requires of the underlying
layers that it delivers messages at least to the
intended recipient.
3.1 Main components
The Secure Method Invocation (SMI) layer
allows a caller object to securely call a
method implemented by a callee object. Both
caller and callee are assumed to be stored
and run in a protected environment (a sand-
box) that disables access to all objects and
data within the sandbox except through pub-
lished interfaces.
The Jason SMI layer provides the following
services:
• identification and authentication of
caller and callee,
• role based access control at the method
level, and
• confidentiality and authenticity of
method parameters and results.
In future versions other services will be ad-
ded like:
• logging
• transaction support
• non-repudiation
To call a method of an object, the caller first
has to connect to the callee in a particu-
lar role. This establishes a security context
between caller and callee, that (among oth-
ers) contains the session keys used to pro-
tect the communication. Once connected,
the caller can call all methods declared by
the object accessible to this role. For Jason,
roles are equivalent to keys. In other words,
ownership of a particular key associated to
a role, proves that an object can connect in
that role.
To establish a connection, the caller needs
a stub corresponding to the object to con-
nect to. Similarly, the callee needs a skel-
eton that receives incoming connections, per-
forms access control decisions and protects
the method parameters and results. The role
keys used to authenticate the caller to the
callee are stored in a separate keystore object
belonging to the same sandbox. This design
is sketched in Fig. 1.
The stub and skeleton necessary to se-
curely call the methods of an object are gen-
erated automatically from a so called Jason
definition file. This file specifies the security
requirements for the callee object. The con-
tents and structure of this file are described
next. Note that the issue of key management
falls beyond the scope of this paper. We are
currently investigating the proper tools to
support key management within the Jason
framework. As far as the Jason SMI platform
is concerned, the keystore contains valid and
proper keys.
3.2 The Jason definition file
The Jason SMI system has a strict separ-
ation between the card application and its
security. An application developer has two
tasks.
• Write a card object without bothering
about security or APDU exchange, in-
stead focusing on the information pro-
cessing logic of the application.
• Write a Jason definition file describing
the security requirements.
Therefore, the security requirements for an
object are written in a separate Jason defini-
tion file that resembles the syntax of a Java
interface description.
caller
stub skeletonkeystore
sandbox
dispatchernetwork
callee
key
store
sandbox
Figure 1: Caller and callee components.
package com.ebank;
public interface Purse
{
roles BANK, MERCHANT, OWNER;
accessible to ALL
authentic short getBalance();
accessible to BANK
authentic short increaseBalance( confidential authentic short amount);
accessible to MERCHANT
authentic short decreaseBalance( authentic short amount);
}
Figure 2: Jason definition file for a simple purse.
A sample Jason definition file appears in
Fig. 2 (describing the interface of a simple
electronic purse application, that will be
studied further in Sect. 5). The Jason pre-
compiler will process the definition file and
generates three files.
• A plain Java interface file. All keywords
not known in Java are removed. This is
the interface implemented by both the
implementation of the callee object and
the client stub.
• A client/caller stub, whose methods are
called to execute the corresponding re-
mote methods, and that performs au-
thentication and marshalling (including
protection) of data.
• A callee skeleton performing access con-
trol decisions, unmarshalling of para-
meters (verifying signatures and de-
crypting parameters where necessary)
for incoming invocation requests, and
executing the actual method.
In Java the keywords private,
protected and public are used to limit
access to methods and fields to certain
classes. An object can only access it’s own
private members, protected members of it’s
superclasses or classes in the same package
and all public members. These keywords
work fine if used inside a single virtual
machine. However, when using a distributed
system a more fine grained solution is
necessary.
In the Jason SMI system, access control
is role based. Moreover, the communication
between caller and callee has to be protected
as well. To specify these requirements, the
Java interface description is extended with
the following keywords.
• roles 〈role-list〉, listing the different
roles in which a caller can connect to
this object. The roles in this list corres-
pond to keys stored in the keystore.
• accessible to 〈role-list〉, specifying
which roles can call the indicated
method.
• confidential and/or authentic, spe-
cifying that a parameter or a method
result should be confidential and/or au-
thenticated.
Here a 〈role〉 is an identifier (usually in all
caps because it is a constant), and a 〈role-
list〉 is a comma-separated list of roles. Let
us discuss the last three keywords in a little
more detail.
accessible to 〈role-list〉 Access to
a method can be limited by using the
accessible keyword. Access is only to be
granted if the caller can be identified (using
the corresponding keys in the keystore) as
a role in 〈role-list〉. The predefined role ALL
indicates that access is allowed for all roles
defined for this object (through the roles
keyword). The predefined role ANYBODY spe-
cifies a role that can be assumed by anybody
(i.e., a role whose identity is not verified). For
security reasons only methods are accessible
from off-the-card applications. Variables
should be accessed through corresponding
set and get methods.
confidential Parameters and return val-
ues can be specified as confidential, mean-
ing that the data involved should be sent en-
crypted between caller and callee. This guar-
antees that nobody else can eavesdrop the
value. In the negotiation phase (see below)
a (symmetric) session key is exchanged and
an encryption algorithm chosen.
authentic Parameters and return values
can also be specified as authentic. This
gives the following guarantees.
authenticity Only the caller can construct
valid parameters5, and only the callee
can construct valid responses. The para-
meter received by the callee was sent by
the caller, and the result received by the
caller was sent by the callee. In par-
ticular, this gives the caller the guar-
antee that the intended side effects of
the method call did in fact occur at the
callee (like decreasing the balance of a
purse).
integrity The parameter (or the result) re-
ceived was not altered while in transit.
freshness The parameter received was
passed by the caller for the current call
of the method (and not for any previous
call). The result received was sent by the
callee for the current call of the method
(giving the guarantee that the method
was actually executed at this time, see
above).
In practice this means that the data involved
should be signed, and that a form of replay
protection is added as well.
3.3 Using SMI
To call a method using the SMI framework,
the caller has to perform the following two
steps (see also Fig. 3 for an example connect-
ing to the purse object whose interface was
given previously).
• The first step is to connect to the callee
and to establish a security context. The
5Strictly speaking, because a symmetric session key
is used to protect the data, also the callee can construct
valid parameters. Therefore non-repudiation cannot be
guaranteed.
try {
Purse purse = (Purse) SMINaming.connect("smi://smartcard/Purse",
Purse.MERCHANT, purseKeyStore) ;
try {
purse.decreaseBalance(10);
System.out.println("You have paid");
}
catch (UserException ue) {
System.out.println("Transaction failed. You have not paid.");
}
}
catch (RemoteException re) {
System.out.println("Failed to connect to service.");
}
Figure 3: Caller connecting to a callee
caller passes the name and location of
the desired service, the desired role in
which to connect, and a reference to the
key store to SMINaming.connect(). When
successful, this returns a reference to
the required stub.
• Subsequently, the methods of the re-
mote object can be called securely as if
they were local methods of the stub re-
turned by the previous step.
If a connection is established, the stub
also contains the current security context
for that connection. Among other things,
this security context contains a session key
used to secure subsequent method invo-
cations. Also, it contains further identi-
fication information on the callee object.
This identity can be retrieved by the stub’s
getSessionIdentifier() method.
Note that even for a single call to a method,
a connection has to be set up. This may
be wasteful for certain applications where
transaction speed is very important (e.g.,
public transport). We are investigating the
possibility of calling a single method without
connecting to the object first (in fact merging
the connection and the calling into one step).
4 Architecture
In this section we describe how the Jason
SMI platform is actually implemented, and
how the security requirements are actually
met using several cryptographic protocols.
In particular we show how a secure connec-
tion is setup, how the ownership of roles is
verified, and how the security context is es-
tablished. Secondly, we show how a method
is called securely using the information and
session keys in the current security context.
But first we will discuss the keys stored in
the keystore in a little more detail.
4.1 On keys
The keys in the keystore correspond one-
to-one to the roles declared in the Jason
definition file. The keystore also contains
keys for key-management. This is discussed
in a forthcoming paper.
Jason supports the use of different types
of keys in the keystore, depending on the se-
curity requirements of the application (or in-
deed individual objects on particular smart
cards). Currently, the following types of keys
are supported.
• RSA, with 512, 1024 and 2048 bit keys.
• DES and 3DES.
• AES, with 128, 192 and 256 bit KEYS.
Moreover, Jason supports diversified
keys [AB96] where the key ki stored by
callee i (used by the callee to authenticate
the caller or vice versa) is derived from the
master key kM stored by the caller. The key
is derived using the formula
ki = {i}kM ,
where {m}k denotes encryption of message
m using key k (where the encryption method
is defined by the type of the key). Note that
in this case ki performs the role of a public
key (from which the corresponding private
key cannot be derived), but with additional
property that it proves to the caller the iden-
tity i of the callee.
Depending on the type of key stored in the
keystore, the appropriate authentication pro-
tocol is run. Note that the caller keystore
contains the keys necessary to prove its role
(e.g., private keys), while the callee keystore
contains the keys necessary to verify a role
(e.g., public keys). If an entry in the caller
keystore is null or invalid, the caller cannot
assume the corresponding role. If an entry
in the callee keystore is null or invalid, the
role cannot be verified and all connections
for that role will be refused.
Finally, the keystore contains, for each role
key, information about the type of cipher
that should be used to protect the session
once the caller has been authenticated and
accepted.
4.2 Connecting to an object
Connecting to an object exchanges and
verifies the identity and role of the caller and
the callee. Furthermore, a security context is
established (containing a shared secret key)
that is used to protect all calls to methods of
the object. To connect to an object and estab-
lish a session the following steps are taken
(assuming RSA style authentication).
• The caller sends a message containing
– the role (as an index in the key-
store) as which it wants to connect,
– the type of key it will use to au-
thenticate the role (RSA in this ex-
ample),
– a list of all ciphers it will accept to
protect the session, and
– a nonce.
• The callee looks up the role and the type
of keys it can accept. If it can accept
the suggested authentication method, it
will select one of the ciphers to pro-
tect the session from the list it received
(provided it supports it). It then sends
the following message
– the selected cipher to protect the
session,
– a random master secret encrypted
with the public RSA key found for
the role in the keystore, and
– a nonce,
• The caller validates the proposed cipher,
decrypts the master secret with its
private key in the keystore.
• Both caller and callee generate the ses-
sion key (using hashes) from the master
secret and both the caller and the callee
nonces.
• Caller and callee exchange further
identifying information encrypted and
MAC-ed using the session key, and re-
cord that in the security context.
Both caller and callee record the session key
in the security context for this connection.
Note that if a connection is established as
ANYBODY, no verification of that role can be
performed. In that case, the master secret
must be exchanged using a Diffie-Helman
type key exchange. Future method invoca-
tions are will be secured using this session
key.
The session context also contains two
counters, one to count the number of mes-
sages sent in this session, and one to count
the number of messages received. Both are
reset to 0 at the start of a session, and incre-
mented for each message sent or received.
These numbers are used to protect against
replay, as explained below.
4.3 Method invocation
Informally speaking, after session setup
the stub and the skeleton are connected by
a (secure) byte stream. The byte stream
is routed by the communications layer to
the correct skeleton. In fact, when a stub’s
method is invoked, it does the following:
• reconnect to the remote JVM containing
the remote object,
• marshal(write and transmit) the para-
meters to the remote JVM,
• wait for the result of the method invoc-
ation,
• unmarshal (read) the return value or ex-
ception returned, and
• return the value to the caller.
The stub hides the serialisation of paramet-
ers and the network-level communication in
order to present a simple invocation mech-
anism to the caller.
In the remote JVM, each remote object has
a corresponding skeleton. The skeleton is re-
sponsible for dispatching the call to the ac-
tual remote object implementation. When a
skeleton receives an incoming method invoc-
ation it does the following:
• unmarshal (read) the parameters for the
remote method,
• invoke the method on the actual remote
object implementation, and
• marshal (write and transmit) the result
(return value) to the caller.
The byte stream sent from stub to skeleton
contains the following elements.
• The name (or rather the index) of the
method to call, together with a MAC
computed using the session key and
the current value of the sent messages
counter. Even if RMI is used as the trans-
port mechanism, this information is ne-
cessary to prevent remote method in-
vocations being redirected to the wrong
method.
• Each confidential parameter is encryp-
ted.
• For each authentic parameter, a MAC
computed using the session key and
the current value of the sent messages
counter is appended to the parameter.
For efficiency reasons parameters are
shuﬄed so that the confidential and
authentic parameters are placed in con-
tiguous blocks within the byte stream (see
Fig. 4). All confidential parameters are en-
crypted as a single block. Similarly, the MAC
for all authentic parameters is computed in
a single block, appending the sent messages
counter only once.
The return stream from skeleton to stub to
communicate results has the following struc-
ture.
• If the return type is confidential, the re-
turn value is encrypted with the session
key.
• If the return type is authentic, the sent
messages count is appended to the byte
stream, and both the count and the
value are used to compute a MAC with
the session key. The result is appended
to the byte stream.
4.4 Inter object communication
Because the caller and callee are physic-
ally separated by a network, the call to a re-
mote method must be transferred to the re-
mote object over the network before it can be
executed there. The most natural approach
would be to use Java’s Remote Method In-
vocation mechanism to achieve this. At the
caller side, the SMI stub first converts the
method  
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Figure 4: Byte stream structure from caller to callee.
parameters to a protected bytestream, as ex-
plained in Sect. 4.3. The RMI layer than
transmits this bytestream to the callee, and
invokes the corresponding method of the
callee SMI skeleton. There, the access per-
missions are checked and the bytestream is
unpacked before the original callee method
is invoked.
However, this scenario is complicated by
the fact that JavaCard (as of version 2.2)
uses a different RMI system, if only because
a JavaCard is not connected to a network
directly, but instead communicates with the
outside world through a terminal using an
APDU stream. This would imply that the ter-
minal has to convert an incoming RMI re-
quest to a JavaCard specific JC-RMI request
(and similarly for the responses). This does
not appear to be straightforward, because
the RMI wire protocols are different. The
only option is to create – for each skeleton
on the callee smart card – a separate skel-
eton (and stub) for the terminal, that receives
the incoming RMI request and simply calls
the remote method on the smart card using
JC-RMI. This means the terminal potentially
needs access to a huge number of skeletons
and stubs, simply to pass bytestreams ver-
batim!
Moreover, we note that RMI’s support for
marshalling and unmarshalling of method
parameters and results becomes totally su-
perfluous in this approach, because the SMI
layer already converts the parameters to a
bytestream in the first place.
To solve the first problem RMI and JC-
RMI need to be brought more in line, such
that their wire protocols become sufficiently
compatible to allow translations between
them using a generic translation mechan-
ism running in the terminal. To solve the
second problem, the RMI system should
provide versatile hooks to allow the outgo-
ing bytestream to be protected in the fine
grained manner required by Jason. Or, SMI
should be incorporated into the RMI layer.
5 Example
Fig. 2 in section 3.2 shows the security
requirements of a simple purse application.
It corresponds to the actual implementation
given in Fig 5. Clearly the implementation is
quite straightforward. Also, the strictness of
the separation between implementation and
its security is apparent. The implementation
does not contain a single line of code con-
cerning security. All the security is contained
in the generated stub and skeleton. The skel-
eton calls the implementation and adds se-
curity to it. Note that each method is defined
with the default Java visibility, to allow the
skeleton to access them, but not giving ac-
cess to subclasses outside the package.
6 Conclusions & Further Research
We are currently implementing the
Jason SMI framework on a JavaCard
2.2 platform. The final implementa-
tion will be available under the GNU
package com.ebank;
class PurseImpl implements Purse {
public static final byte OVERFLOW = (byte) 1;
public static final byte UNDERFLOW = (byte) 2;
private short balance = 0;
private static final short MAX = (short) 500;
short getBalance() {
return balance;
}
short increaseBalance(short amount) throws UserException {
if (balance + amount < MAX) {
balance += amount;
return amount;
} else
UserException.throwIt(OVERFLOW);
}
short decreaseBalance(short amount) {
if (balance - amount > 0) {
balance -= amount;
return amount;
} else
UserException.throwIt(UNDERFLOW);
}
}
Figure 5: Implementation of a simple purse.
General Public License (GPL) through
http://www.cs.kun.nl/∼jhh/jason.html
within a few months.
We intend to extend Jason’s SMI function-
ality with logging and auditing functions, as
well as transaction (and rollback) support.
Related to the logging and auditing issue,
is the fact that the current implementation
does not provide non-repudiation. The rami-
fications for implementing non-repudiation
are the subject of further investigations.
Also, one could argue that the authentic
keyword is overloaded (in the sense that it
gives too many guarantees, especially fresh-
ness, at the cost of a more complex and
resource consuming protection mechanism).
Using Jason to develop several real-world
smart card applications will tell whether a
more fine grained set of security specifica-
tion keywords is required.
Finally, to make the Jason vision of a
smart card application consisting of millions
of distributed objects a reality, object broker
functionality has to be added that is con-
sistent with the high security requirements
of typical smart card applications, and the
highly dynamical nature of the smart card
network.
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